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The Barcelona Summer Olympics of 1992 are remembered as a model of urban 
regeneration, especially in terms of their ability to change the spatial structure and 
image of the city (Garcia-Ramon and Albet, 2000; Marshall, 1996, 2000, 2004; 
Monclús, 2003). To the organizers, the event itself was not considered “high risk.” At 
the global level, there were some thinking about possible reprisal attacks on 
competing nations in the Olympics for their involvement in the Gulf War (1990-91) 
(Coaffee and Johnston, 2007:146). Domestically, there was some concern that the 
Olympics might be used as a platform for publicity by those seeking greater political 
autonomy from the centralist state based in Madrid. Notably, there had been long-
standing tensions in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, where a strong sense 
of social and cultural identity has underpinned demands for greater political and 
economic independence (Conversi, 1997). The location of the Games in Barcelona, 
the most populous and powerful city within these potentially divergent autonomous 
regions, obviously had particular resonance. By analysing the spatial organization of 
the four main Olympic venues across the city, the coordination between the multi-
sectoral agencies involved in surveillance, and their strategies to counter any potential 
threat of disruption, the argument taken in this chapter suggests that in terms of 
security, the success of the event had more to do with political debate and the 
recognition that any disruption would be counterproductive to the respective causes. 
The principal threats to the tranquillity of the Games stemmed more from political 
and regional tensions within Spain than from externally-generated instability. 
However, in terms of security, the success of the event was partly determined by the 
recognition by potential dissidents that disruption to such a globally high-profile event 
would be counterproductive to their causes. 
 
 
Barcelona as the Host City 
 
The background to staging the Olympic Games in Barcelona provides an important 
context within which to understand perceptions of security and implementation of 
surveillance technologies and practices in the local and global circumstances. 
Barcelona, with a population of about three million, has been the economic and 
cultural capital of Catalonia for many centuries. During the twentieth century, the city 
had experienced urban and industrial decline from both changes in the global 
economy and General Franco’s centralised dictatorship after the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-39). Franco’s regime, based in Madrid, stifled the local government’s ability to 
respond to the changing economic trends and acted to repress any expression of 
regional identity and culture. However, the death of Franco in 1975 unleashed forces 
for immense change that had built up by that time, including the establishment of 
more local powers and considerable autonomy for the regions of Spain. In Barcelona, 
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these changes led to the establishment of a relatively powerful new city government 
and an autonomous government for Catalonia, together with the reassertion of Catalan 
identity and culture and a desire to position the city as a modern, post-industrial and 
prosperous city of world standing to attract international investment (Marshall, 1996; 
Monclús, 2007). 
Over the decades following Franco’s death, Barcelona had modernised its port 
and manufacturing sectors to advance its status as an economic powerhouse and 
transformed its older industrial urban districts into the dynamic post-industrial capital 
of culture that it is today. The staging of the Olympic Games in 1992 was a catalyst 
for much of the physical transformation, although the redevelopment was part of a 
longer term strategy. The General Metropolitan Plan of 1976 set out a 50-year 
strategy to guide the spatial adjustments necessary to modernise and sustain the port 
and logistics-based activities, to revitalise the waterfront and public spaces, to restore 
polluted and derelict industrial sites, to invest in road systems and new layouts, and to 
emphasise architectural design (Monclús, 2007:222-223).  
Barcelona has a proud history of using mega-events to drive forward its urban 
development, which has included World Expos in 1888 and 1929 and, more recently, 
the Forum 2004 (a cultural Expo) in 2004 (Monclús, 2007). The International 
Olympic Committee President at the time that the Games were awarded to Barcelona 
in 1986, Juan Antonio Samaranch, who had been a Catalan Francoist, seemed to have 
been aware of the potential of the event for ‘fast-tracking’ the development process in 
his home city (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:82; Hargreaves, 2000:139). Hargreaves 
and Ferrando (1997:86) record, for example, that when the Mayor of Barcelona, 
Narcís Serra, told Samaranch of the city’s desire to stage the Olympics, Samaranch is 
said to have replied: “I accept your challenge” 2.  
Security was one of the initial concerns. When The New York Times reported 
about 1987 bombings by Terra Lliure, a Catalan separatist organisation, and Euzkadi 
Ta Askatasuna (more commonly known by its abbreviation, ETA), the Basque 
separatist group, it also noted that “Maragall, the Mayor [of Barcelona], said that 
security was of prime concern to the city’s Olympic organizers”.  The success of this 
strategy in creating a new urban identity for Barcelona, and indeed for the Spanish 
state, therefore, seems to have depended, at least in part, upon the Olympics being 
perceived as a well organised and, above all, a safe and secure event 
3
. 
The award of the Olympic Games to Barcelona represented an opportunity for 
both the Castilian state and Catalonia to promote their respective political causes. The 
Spanish state wished to use the Olympics as a means of marking the end of the Franco 
regime
4
  and to celebrate the emergence of a new, fully modernised, politically mature 
and unified democratic state to the rest of the world (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 
1997:67). 1992 was a critical year for the country as a whole as it attempted to stage 
not only the Olympics in Barcelona, but the World Expo in Seville and the Cultural 
Capital of Europe in Madrid in what became known as the ‘Spanish Project’ and the 
‘Year of Spain’. The benefits of staging these three international events were 
perceived by the Spanish government as fostering pan-Spanish cooperation and better 
regional working relationships, as well as serving as an equalising force throughout 
Spain’s disparate regions and attracting inward investment 5. 1992 was also perceived 
by some as Spain’s final exam for membership of the club of first world, rich, 
democratic and organised countries (Pi-Sunyer, 1995:37). Although Spain had joined 
the European Community in 1986, the year of 1992 marked the creation of the Single 
European Market, involving the removal of economic barriers to form a ‘free market’ 
in the European Community (Wise and Gibb, 1993). Spain was positioning itself at 
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the forefront of this emerging new Europe. The perception and anticipation of the 
potential of the Olympics for improving the international image of Spain and 
encouraging inward investment is nicely captured in the words of the President of the 
Spanish Olympic Committee and first vice president of the Organizing Committee of 
the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games (COOB’92), Carlos Ferrer Salat: “Its important 
and fundamental that the opening and closing ceremonies of the Games help to 
modernise the image that foreigners have of Spain, because currently we continue to 
be bullfighters and flamenco dancers. If we are able to do this, this will be the best 
benefit possible and compensation for the effort it takes to organise the Games.” 6  
In contrast, public opinion in Catalonia wished to utilise the Olympics as an 
expression of their already existing economic wealth, aspirations for urban 
regeneration, and the distinctive character and culture of their region. Their goal, too, 
was very different, namely to further the political cause of autonomy and greater 
independence. The New York Times wrote, for example, that “… Catalonia, the 
prosperous autonomous region that has Barcelona as its capital, never misses a chance 
to promote its name and its nationalism – and what better chance than the 
Olympics?”. In that same report, Jordi Pujol, President of Catalonia, was quoted as 
saying that “Strictly speaking, these are Barcelona’s games … But spiritually, yes, 
and politically and sentimentally too, these are also very much Catalonia’s games”.7 
Recognition by the International Olympic Committee was seen as a powerful symbol 
of legitimacy for the aspiration of nationhood within Catalonia (Pi-Sunyer, 1995:37). 
On the eve of the Olympics, the Generalitat (regional government) took a two-page 
advertisement, at a cost of about $5.6 m, in several European and American 
newspapers to promote awareness about the status of Catalonia as a ‘country’ within 
Spain. Page one of the advertisement showed the location of Barcelona on a blank 
map of Europe asking the question “What country do you situate this city in?”. The 
second page gave the answer “Catalunya, of course. This is where Barcelona is, in 
Catalunya, a country in Spain with its own culture language and identity.” 8   
In addition, there were political groups in other regions in Spain, such as the 
Basque Country and Galicia, which could have used the Olympics as a platform to 
promote their claim for greater independence but not in the same way. While 
Catalonia recognised that it had the opportunity for entirely legitimate promotion of 
identity, ETA had few options other than the threat of disruptive action. The 
movement from the Basque Country, ETA, was more extreme and had a record of 
terrorist acts within Spain (Hooper, 2006). ETA was established in 1959 as a cultural 
movement to protect the distinctiveness of the region, but by 1963 had become more 
militant and had adopted revolutionary armed struggle and violence as a means of 
achieving its objectives (Conversi, 1997:96). ETA’s campaign involved assassinations 
of police, the military, politicians, businessmen, journalists and academics, as well as 
occasional bombing in the seaside tourist resorts visited by international visitors. Such 
actions claimed the lives of over 800 people by 2009. The staging of the Olympics on 
Spanish soil presented ETA with a potential target and platform to promote its cause 
to a global audience (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:68), although it might also have 
been conscious that such actions might prove counterproductive in terms of negative 
public opinion. 
 
 
Geography of Olympic facilities in Barcelona 
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The geography of the sporting facilities and other infrastructure utilised for the 
Olympic Games of 1992 presented a fundamental challenge for the security of the 
event (see Figure 1). The sporting facilities were provided at four main locations 
across the city. The main venue for the Olympics was the Montjuïc area, which is a 
piece of higher ground to the south west of the city centre used as a defensive location 
and fortification through history. This location contained the redeveloped main 
stadium, originally built for the International Exposition in 1929, together with the 
Sant Jordi Sports Palace and the swimming and diving pools. The area had become a 
well-established park in the city and presented numerous access routes into and across 
the site. The second main venue for the Olympic events was the Vall d’Hebron area, 
which was a large, isolated and unstructured neighbourhood in the west of the city. 
This site provided the venues for cycling, archery and volleyball. 
 The Olympic Village was developed on a 130 ha/1.3km
2
 site previously 
occupied by declining industries on the coast to the north east of the city centre (at 
Parc de Mar). Extensive redevelopment took place in this location involving the 
transfer of the rail route inland, the building of a coastal ring road, the removal of old 
industries, the construction of the Olympic Village and a new marina (Olympic 
Harbour). Parc de Mar was constructed as a continuation of the Eixample district and 
opened up 5.2km of coastline previously blocked by railway lines (Essex and 
Chalkley, 1998; Chalkley and Essex, 1999). The fourth Olympic site, on the 
Diagonal, hosted the football, polo and tennis. A ring road linked the Olympic venues 
together, along with new traffic interchanges and a computerised traffic management 
system (Hargreaves, 2000:155). 
  
 
Organisation of Surveillance to Deliver a Secure Event 
 
Security considerations had been a central part of the bid process and evaluation by 
the International Olympic Committee. The Olympics had been awarded to Barcelona 
on 17 October, 1986 and by June, 1987, a Higher Commission for Olympic Security 
had been set up in the city to plan and implement the surveillance procedures and 
technologies needed to deliver a safe and secure event. A Technical Security Cabinet, 
involving representatives from the Organising Committee and the Higher 
Commission for Olympic Security, was formed in 1988 to analyse lessons from 
previous Olympic Games, including observation of the Calgary and Seoul Games, and 
to propose a model for the Barcelona event. According to the Olympic Organizing 
Committee report, “the Olympic security operation began in stages and in 1989 the 
surveillance and counter-surveillance services at the Olympic building sites and 
information gathering tasks, among others, were already underway”9. With 39,462 
accredited members of the ‘Olympic family’ (including athletes, officials, media, 
VIPs and guests of sponsors) and nearly 0.5m spectators, together with the eyes of the 
world on Barcelona (estimated to be 2,300m/2.3bil for the Opening Ceremony)
10
, the  
preparations to deliver security required just as much time and planning as the 
infrastructural developments. 
The proposed model to deliver security was an integrated system of public and 
private plans and resources under the command of the Higher Commission for 
Olympic Security. Collaboration involved a huge range of surveillance operatives (see 
Table 1). The Olympic Security Master Plan
11
 was organised around three types of 
operational projects: (1) functions (eg. public safety, road safety); (2) specifics (eg. 
information security, explosive deactivation, VIP protection) and; (3) activities (eg. 
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sports competition, accommodation, telecommunications, and logistics)
12
. A total of 
17 broad security operations were identified, within which there were 86 specific 
projects covering a broad range of measures to protect aspects as diverse as public 
safety, ticketing, telecommunications, transport and Olympic sponsorship and image 
rights (see Table 2). This structure evolved during the preparations for the Games. 
The Mayor of Barcelona was reported as saying that “ ‘We have met with teams from 
America’s State Department and National Security Council: we’re in touch with 
private security firms; we talked to security people from Los Angeles, and the IOC is 
advising us,’ he said ‘We’re getting a lot of advice. The IOC told us we had too many 
agencies, 70, involved in security. We’ve cut that down and named a single person to 
be in charge of security planning.’” Each specific project was assigned to an 
organisation with a director and their own Olympic Security Office to supervise, 
coordinate, monitor, control and manage the risk to security
13
. All projects were ready 
by June, 1990
14
. 
 During the Games, the so-called “standard operations plans” noted above were 
translated into “territorial operations plans,” involving a highly coordinated task force 
approach. Three territorial units were established with command centres (CEMAN) 
and coordination centres (CECOR): Level 1 (base level), where surveillance 
operations were carried out by the operatives at each sports venue or centre; Level 2 
(area level), which brought all level 1 operations into a territorial area; and Level 3 
(command level) comprising the centralised Olympic Security Centre for the whole 
city (Centro de Seguridad Olímpica) (see Figure 2). This hierarchical structure 
ensured that the lines of communication were centralised to allow operations to be 
properly coordinated. Centro de Seguridad Olímpica was itself linked to a Crisis 
Centre in Madrid should circumstances require. Such arrangements contributed to the 
creation of multi-scalar partnerships in Spain and so assist in reducing potential 
tensions and suspicions through collaboration and consensus. 
 The surveillance technologies and practices for the Olympic Games involved 
the ‘Olympic Adaptation Project’. Hargreaves (2000:133) notes that most measures 
were implemented discreetly and were not overbearing. However, at some strategic 
locations, these practices and technologies were obviously conspicuous (Coafee and 
Johnston, 2007:147). According to the Organising Committee’s report to the 
International Olympic Committee, “security considerations made it advisable to seal 
off the whole of the Olympic Village with a double line of steel fencing, and to place 
very strict access controls at the entrances to the residential area and the international 
zone.” This zone included “each of the various sports facilities in the Parc de Mar 
Area” which also “constituted a sealed area.” In addition, “the mouth of the Olympic 
Harbour and the beaches of the Olympic Village were protected by underwater 
fencing as well as by coastal patrols.” So, too, “the Parc de Mar Village was a sealed 
area,” adding to the list of strict access controls imposed at entrances to residential 
areas and the international zones
15
. About 28,725 police and armed forces personnel 
were deployed during the Olympics, together with an additional 8,624 volunteers and 
145 contracted staff, who were hired by the Organising Committee to deal with its 
COOB internal company security and security at Olympic facilities during the Games 
period.
16
  
These arrangements proved successful to the organizers and the local and 
international audiences in that there was no serious incident. The Barcelona Director 
of Security, Santiago de Sicart, has subsequently acted as a security advisor for the 
International Olympic Committee Coordination Commissions for the Summer and 
Winter Olympic Games of 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006, demonstrating the 
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development of intellectual capital can become highly marketable in terms of 
transnational knowledge transfer for future events. The influence of these ‘security 
experts’ has therefore been longstanding, although their identity has not always been 
known. As the International Olympic Committee acknowledged in one of its reports, 
it was the “Director of Security at the Games of the XXV Olympiad in Barcelona in 
1992 and [the] security expert on the 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 IOC Coordination 
Committees” who contributed research reports to the Security Working Group 
evaluating the bids for the 2010 Winter Olympics.
17
 Their names were made public by 
The New York Times during the time of the Salt Lake City Games: “… the security 
chiefs from the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and the 2000 Sydney Games, Santiago de 
Sicard [sic] and Peter Ryan, were acting as advisers for Salt Lake and for future 
Games”18. 
According to Coaffee and Johnston (2007:146), a total of $66.2m was spent   
to ensure security for the Barcelona Olympics, that is, $7,072 per athlete. 
Interestingly, this figure is considerably less than the Games immediately before or 
after the Barcelona Olympics (see Figure 3). The reason may be that key personnel 
were drawn from the Spanish military and police forces rather than private security 
companies. It also reflects perceptions and estimates of threats from domestic or 
international terrorism by the organizers of the Games.  
 
 
Perceptions and Estimates of Risks to Security 
 
There was recognition that the use of the Barcelona Olympics as a platform for 
publicity by regional groups seeking greater political autonomy from the state, 
especially in Catalonia itself and the Basque Country, had the potential, however 
small, to be a destabilising force for the event (Hargreaves, 2000:165), although these 
tensions were largely played out in symbolic terms. The ‘physical’ dangers 
anticipated were relatively modest, whereas the potential for embarrassment was the 
real concern. Soon after the city had won the bid to stage the event, a number of 
pressure groups and political parties based in Catalonia sought the ‘Catalanisation’ of 
the Games.
19
 One of the most prominent groups was the Associació per a la 
Delegació Olimpica de Catalunya which demanded, from January 1987, recognition 
of a Catalan Olympic Committee. The establishment of the Catalan Olympic 
Committee would ensure that identifying symbols of Catalonia, such as flag and 
national anthem, would be used if a Catalan athlete won an Olympic medal. 
According to a poll reported in the El País newspaper on 5 January, 1990, 86 per cent 
of the Catalan public supported recognition of a Catalan Olympic Committee.
20
  Such 
aspirations were shared by other groups, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(a republican political party), La Crida a la Solidaritat (Appeal for Solidarity), a 
militant independista pressure group campaigning for Catalan independence, and 
Omnium Cultural/Acció Olímpica, an influential cultural group with the backing of 
the party in power in regional government (Hargreaves, 2000:62). At the inauguration 
of the refurbished Olympic stadium on Montjuïc in September, 1989, the King of 
Spain and the Spanish team were jeered by the largely Catalan crowd (Hargreaves and 
Ferrando, 1997:68). Hargreaves (2000:65) suggests that the crowd were ill-tempered 
because of national propaganda circulated at the event, heavy-handed security 
measures, bad weather and the delayed arrival of the King.  
It was concluded that a repeat of such actions during the Olympics themselves 
would represent a potential source of political embarrassment, which could reflect 
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badly on Spain’s progress in achieving national integration, identity and pride, and 
have negative ramifications for the country’s international status. The act positioned 
the Olympic organisers and the Spanish government in front of a dilemma. On the one 
hand, they saw a need to give surveillance measures utmost priority to ensure that the 
Olympics in Barcelona were a successful and trouble-free event. On the other hand, 
allowing the regional groups to have some voice would permit the Spanish 
government to display its democratic credentials. After forty years of dictatorship, the 
State would not wish to continue to appear as a police state by suppressing and/or 
overriding such claims. Similarly, the regional groups were aware of the potential for 
alienating any support for their cause through unreasonable demands and/or 
unpopular acts. Neither the State nor public opinion in Catalonia had any interest in 
using violence as a means to achieve its goal. Consequently, there was a lot of good 
will and diplomacy at work, which reduced the actual risk of disruption. 
 The political process helped to manage the public debate over the extent of 
state and regional symbolism to be used in the Barcelona Games and ultimately to 
ensure that an appropriate compromise was reached between excessive 
Castilianisation and excessive Catalanisation. The Organising Committee of the 
Games comprised Barcelona City Council, the Catalan regional government 
(Generalitat), the Spanish government and the Spanish Olympic Committee, 
reflecting the multi-scalar collaboration required in the organisation of international 
events. Barcelona City Council played the key role in the preparations and was run by 
the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) led by Pasqual Maragall (as Mayor). The Catalan 
Socialist Party is affiliated to the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), which 
formed the Spanish national government in Madrid at the time. The former Mayor of 
Barcelona, Narcís Serra, who had instigated the Olympic bid and who had appointed 
Maragall, had become a key figure in Spanish national politics as Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defense (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:67).
21
 Maragall’s 
task was to stage a sufficiently Catalan event without unduly distressing opinion in 
Madrid (Pi-Sunyer, 1995:43), although his overriding objective was the urban 
regeneration of the city. In contrast, the Generalitat was run by Convergencia i Unío, 
a Catalan nationalist coalition, led by Jordi Pujol, a centre-right pragmatic nationalist, 
who was more strident in promoting regional interests with less deference to Madrid 
(Pi-Sunyer, 1995:43).
22
 His public statements often expressed strong pro-Catalan 
views, while others were couched in more conciliatory terms.
23
  Therefore, the 
potential political tensions were not simply between the Spanish government and the 
regional government, but also, to some extent, between the interests of the regional 
government and the city government. The views of politicians from the city and 
region were constantly in the forefront of mass media coverage, while contributions 
from Madrid were sidelined. Politicians in central government avoided any public 
engagement in the symbolism debate and were non-confrontational.
24
 
 Nevertheless, the ‘Catalanisation’ of the Olympic Games began to gain a 
higher profile in the pre-Olympics period. In April, 1992, Esquerra Republicana 
organised a three kilometre banner around the Olympic Stadium promoting their 
cause. It gained publicity by being the largest banner in the world for the Guinness 
Book of World Records. A cardboard effigy of the Barcelona Olympic mascot, Cobi, 
was burned. Supporters of the Catalanist movement, La Crida distributed materials 
including stickers, posters, clothing and a leaflet explaining the case for the 
‘Catalanisation’ of the Games.25 
 On 7 May, 1992, the local political groups announced, at a press conference 
hosted by the Catalan Olympic Committee, La Crida, Esquerra Republicana and 
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Omnium Cultural/Acció Olímpica, five minimums for the Catalan presence that 
would be acceptable during the Games: 
 Catalan athletes must march separately under the Catalan flag 
 The Catalan hymn must be used with other national anthems 
 Catalan athletes who win medals must be able to choose between the Catalan 
and Spanish anthems at awards ceremonies 
 The participating countries must march according to the alphabetical order of 
the Catalan language 
 The International Olympic Committee must publicly state that there is no legal 
reason that the Catalan Olympic Committee cannot be recognised.
26
 
 
The groups stated that if these minimums were not met, then there would be 
community demonstrations in the lead up to the opening ceremony of the Olympic 
Games in Barcelona. A pact (Paz Olímpica) between the Mayor of Barcelona  and the 
President of the Generalitat (Catalan autonomous regional government)  less than two 
months before the opening ceremony attempted to pacify the Catalan cause. The main 
concessions and agreements were: 
 The credit for a successful Games would be shared by all participants 
 The Games should be carried out peacefully in order to enhance the prestige of 
both Barcelona and Catalonia 
 The symbols of Catalonia would be showcased at the Games 
 The Spanish, Catalan and Barcelona flags will have equal status during the 
opening ceremony and the King of Spain would enter the stadium to the 
Spanish national anthem and the Catalan ‘Els Segadors’ hymn. Catalan would 
be an official language. 
 Residents of Catalonia are encouraged to show their support for the Olympics 
by hanging banners of all types outside their homes.
27
 
 
These concessions were accepted by the Esquerra Republicana political party as they 
sensed that public opinion had become tired of the ongoing debate. As reported in the 
La Vanguardia
28
 newspaper on 10 June, 1992, the party’s president announced a 
‘cease-fire’ over the symbolic content of Olympic ceremonies and that public pressure 
had stopped Spanish centralists from hijacking the Games.
29
 La Crida and the Catalan 
Olympic Committee were less content with the pact, especially regarding the use of 
the ‘senyera’ flag during the awards ceremonies for Catalan athletes.30 However, 
public reaction against these continued demands of the Catalan groups, as reflected in 
newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, began regarding them as unreasonable 
and disloyal.
31
  
The threat of disruption continued in the immediate build-up to the opening 
ceremony on 25 July, 1992 (Hargreaves, 2000:65). The 5,570km Olympic torch run 
through all 17 autonomous regions of Spain in June, 1992 was disrupted by 
demonstrations, flags and slogans. At various points along the Olympic torch run 
through Catalonia to Barcelona, the flame was surrounded by demonstrators with 
Catalan flags chanting slogans.
32
 Security remained low-profile and discreet to avoid 
inflaming the situation and perhaps as a deliberate attempt by the authorities to show 
that democratic rights in the ‘new’ Spain were no longer restrained. It was at one such 
demonstration, at the coastal town of Empúries on 13 June, 1992, that press coverage, 
particularly in La Vanguardia and public opinion began to turn against such protests. 
The display of the ‘Freedom for Catalonia’ flag33 during a saxophone solo of ‘El Cant 
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dels Ocells’, itself a symbol of the region, was portrayed as a shameful and inane act 
in newspaper coverage. The incident was not shown in the television coverage of the 
event.
34
 It soon became clear through editorials and letters to editors of newspapers, 
that the public was growing increasingly  intolerant of any further disruption that 
might threaten the success of the event and that the public wanted the Games  to be 
allowed to ‘play out’ peacefully (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:84). 
In March, shortly before the Games, a dozen ETA members were arrested 
because the authorities reasoned that such an arrest would diffuse the threat of attacks 
during the Games. As the New York Times reported, “The arrest last month of … the 
leader of the Basque Homeland and Liberty organisation, known by its Spanish 
initials, ETA, and 11 of his associates heartened authorities that ETA might be 
diffused enough to pose a lesser threat to the Olympics, which begin July 25.” 35 This 
act seems to have earned broad public support and a wave of positive feedback for the 
central government.
36
 Nevertheless, according to Toohey (2008:435), ETA did bomb 
electricity pylons to disrupt electricity supplies during the Opening Ceremony.  
Outside of the regional political disputes, Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista 
Primo October (‘Grapo’), a Marxist group, which inflicted attacks in various parts of 
Spain between 1975 and 2000, exploded bombs on a gas pipeline about 30 miles 
outside Barcelona during the Games. The incident was reported in the UK media:  
 
“Juan Antonio Samaranch, the president of the IOC, denied that yesterday’s bomb 
attack on a pipeline 30 miles outside Barcelona at Vilafranca, said to be the work of 
the extreme left-wing group, Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primo October, posed 
any threat to the Games, which were taking place under tight security. ‘I don’t think 
you can say that it is a threat because the incident took place nowhere near an 
Olympic site’, he said. Police dismissed any possibility that the explosion was the 
work of either Basque or Catalan separatists”.37  
 
The US media also makes reference to the potential threat from Grapo:  
 
“But one security expert in the region said the resurgence of a left-wing guerrilla 
group known as Grapo [Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primo October] also bears 
watching, particularly by United States interests. Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista 
Primo October was actively involved in the campaign several years ago to close two 
United States military bases in Spain, in Torrejon and Zaragoza. The Air Force finally 
left Torrejon two weeks ago, and the remaining American ground crews at Zaragoza 
will be gone by the Olympics. ‘Grapo was very active a couple of years ago,’ said the 
expert, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ‘Most of the leaders ended up in jail, 
and six months ago, I wouldn’t have thought they posed much of a problem. But then 
they were involved in a couple of low-grade bombings, and their leader escaped from 
jail last week. So I don’t know what they’re capable of.’”38.  
 
According to Cotterell (2003:311), both incidents caused inconvenience, but did not 
gain global media attention and did not disrupt the event. 
During the Games, important gestures to Catalonia were made: most notably, 
the King declared the Games open in Catalan. Even the Spanish flag, which is 
perceived as a symbol of past oppression in Catalonia, appeared more frequently in 
the stadium and on the streets (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:73-74). Some Catalan 
groups continued to use the Games to publicise their cause by claiming that the 
surveillance procedures threatened freedom of expression and civil liberties. La Crida 
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described the deployment of the surveillance and security operatives   as an 
occupation of Catalan territory (Hargreaves, 2000:80). Over 30 people were arrested 
for being members or supporters of a minor Catalan terrorist organisation, Terra 
Lliure (Free Land) (Hargreaves and Ferrando, 1997:74), which had been established 
as a Catalan attempt to emulate ETA (Tremlett, 2006:332).  The group, in turn, 
understood these arrests as evidence of on-going state oppression and intimidation 
(Hargreaves, 2000:84). Disruption of the Olympic Games itself was nevertheless 
minimal, yet surveillance procedures during the Games appeared for the most part 
discreet and not over-bearing. Police and paramilitary drafted in from other parts of 
Spain were issued with guidelines on how to treat Catalans and their culture with 
respect. Plain-clothes police were disguised as volunteers and what was deemed 
‘dangerous propaganda material’ was confiscated (Hargreaves, 2000:132). It may 
well be a testament to the measures used at the event that, in a survey of 800 Catalan 
residents undertaken for the La Vanguardia newspaper following the Games, the 
achievement of a secure event was regarded as the most successful aspect of the 
Barcelona Olympics by the majority of the city’s population (Hargreaves and 
Ferrando, 1997:75-76; Hargreaves, 2000:133).  
 
 
   
Conclusion 
 
The organizers of the Barcelona Olympics saw domestic political groups interested in 
furthering their cause of regional autonomy and independence as a potential threat to 
security of the event, rather any disruption from external sources. Despite the 
extensive surveillance measures which have become a model for subsequent Olympic 
Games, much of the ‘threat’ was dissipated through dialogue, compromise, some 
arrests, and careful public relations and media management, together with common 
sense rather than confrontation or aggression. In this respect, the organisers had 
shown to the world that Spain was no longer ruled by a fascist regime, but was an 
open and democratic State. The Games played a big role in bringing maturity and 
pragmatism to relations between Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona and hence reduced 
overall political tensions. The benefits of the Olympic Games for both the greater 
Spanish nation-state and the regions were ultimately recognised by most interest 
groups and led to a struggle largely fought out in symbolic terms. The Olympic 
Games were allowed to be staged without being affected by terrorist acts (Hargreaves, 
2000:161). Some argue that, as a result, the Barcelona Olympics acted to advance the 
cause of Catalan nationalism for a greater degree of autonomy within the existing 
democratic constitution (Hargreaves, 2000:165). Others regard the Barcelona 
Olympics as a missed opportunity to strengthen the region’s political identity (Pi-
Sunyer, 1995:50). The International Olympic Committee, for example, refused to 
recognise the Catalan Olympic Committee some months after the Games in Barcelona 
on the grounds that Catalonia was not a state. Despite the potential threats, the 
Olympics themselves were safe and secure, which ultimately enabled Barcelona to 
establish itself as a cultural capital of Europe and a truly global city; helped the 
country to consolidate its rapid socio-economic maturity; and bring greater mutual 
acceptance to late twentieth century Spain. 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 12 
Table 1. Security forces deployed during the Barcelona Olympic Games, 
1992 
 
Security force Responsibility Personnel deployed 
National Police 80% of Olympic facilities 
(venues, training sites, 
Olympic Village and 
official hotels) and most 
of the functional plans 
15,500 
Guardia Civil Airports, Port of 
Barcelona, four venues, 
essential public services 
(water, fuel, electricity, 
telecommunications, 
transportation) 
5,000 
Mossos d’Esquadra 
(Catalan police) 
Two competition 
venues, crime 
prevention activities (eg. 
ticket touting and 
commercial crime) 
385 
Barcelona City Police Traffic and street public 
safety. Dealing with 
victims of crime 
2,890 
Local Police Forces Within municipal 
territories 
1,700 
Army Supported Guardia Civil 
to protect essential 
services and human 
resources for COOB’92  
3,000 
Air Force Protection of air space 250 
Navy Territorial waters and 
water competition areas 
Undisclosed 
 Total: 28,725 
SOURCE: US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; 
Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee39 
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Table 2.  Olympic Security Projects at the Barcelona Olympic Games, 1992 
 
Programme Project Responsible agency 
Intelligence and special services Interior and exterior Staff, accreditations and ticket control Department Of State Security 
Special operations National Police 
Explosives detection and deactivation Guardia Civil 
Internal Security 1: COOB’92 
company security 
COOB’92 company security, staff control, logistics COOB’92 
Internal Security 2: accident and 
intrusion 
Physical security of Olympic facilities and surroundings COOB’92 
Internal Security 3: access 
control 
Accreditations, tickets and access COOB’92 
Transport Security Official transport security National Police 
Mobility and road security Barcelona City Council, local 
police forces, Generalitat of 
Catalonia 
Accommodation security Accommodation and Olympic Villages security National Police 
Competitions, events and 
ceremonies security 
Security for Olympic torch, ceremonies, competition and training, 
congress, cultural event and Paralympics 
National Police 
VIP and special risk delegation 
security 
VIP security and Special risk delegation security National Police 
Olympic support services 
security 
Olympic services security, doping control security, security air cover National Police 
Information security Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
Arrival and departure management and security Guardia Civil 
Public safety Crime prevention, judicial police, public order, commercial crime National Police 
Dealing with victims of crime City Councils 
Public Services security Essential public services security, Transport and communications 
security and Frontier security 
Guardia Civil 
Administration and control of territorial waters and air space affected by 
the Games 
Ministry of Defence 
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Emergencies Internal security and emergencies at Olympic sites and power Fire Extinction and Rescue 
Services and Generalitat of 
Catalonia 
Internal security and emergencies: water supply and flood Junta d’Aigües 
Internal security and emergencies: telecommunications Department of 
Telecommunications 
Internal security and emergencies: land passenger transport and of 
dangerous materials 
Dirección General de 
Transporte 
Internal security and emergencies: air transport National airports 
Internal security and emergencies: sea transport Dirección General de la Marina 
Mercante 
Internal security and emergencies: chemicals Genercia de Protección Civil 
Thermal inversion emergency Barcelona City Council 
Planning Olympic Security Plan, monitoring basic infrastructures, tests Higher Commission For 
Olympic Security 
Administration Agreements, economics, logistics, office, legal, administration Higher Commission For Olympic 
Security 
Human Resources Human resources management, staff selection, training, food and 
accommodation, transport, medical and health, social and labour 
relations 
Higher Commission For Olympic 
Security 
Telecommunications and 
computers 
Telecommunications networks and equipment Higher Commission For Olympic 
Security 
Computer networks and equipment Department Of State Security 
Relations with the community Image and relations with media Higher Commission For Olympic 
Security 
SOURCE: Barcelona Olympic Games Organising Committee (COOB’92) (1994), pp.308-309. 
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Figure 1.  The location of the main venues used in the Barcelona Olympic Games 
in 1992 (Adapted from Essex and Chalkley, 1998, p.198) 
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Figure 2. The organisational framework of security forces at the Barcelona 
Olympic Harbour (Source: Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee, 
1992, p.307). 
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Figure 3.  Security costs of the Summer Olympic Games, 1984-2004 
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